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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v* 
COREY LYNN BROOKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920853-CA 
Priority No, 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992 Supp.) provides 
this Court's jurisdiction over this case transferred from the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the record of the jury selection demonstrate that a 
new trial is necessary? 
2. Do Mr. Brooks' convictions for burglary and robbery 
illegally punish him twice for one crime? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The jury selection issue involves this Court's 
determination of whether the trial court abused his discretion in 
conducting an inadequate voir dire of the potential jurors, and/or 
whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 
request an adequate voir dire, in using a peremptory challenge to 
remove a presumptively prejudiced juror, and in allowing tainted 
panelists to serve on Mr. Brooks' jury. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 
P.2d 170, 175-178 (Utah App. 1992). 
The sentencing issue involves the "abuse of discretion" 
standard, which encompasses whether the trial court "fail[ed] to 
consider all legally relevant factors" and whether the sentence is 
"clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 of this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV section 1 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-402 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 46 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Brooks with one count of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-302; with one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree 
felony violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203; and with one 
count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a 
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second degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503 
(R. 6-8).1 Mr. Brooks waived his preliminary hearing, and the 
magistrate bound him over as charged (R. 2-3). The first trial of 
this case was defended by James A. Valdez in October of 1991, and 
ended in a mistrial as a result of a hung jury (R. 32-37). On 
December 31, 1991, Nick H. Porterfield entered an appearance of 
counsel for Mr. Brooks (R. 76). A jury convicted Mr. Brooks of the 
first two counts on March 27, 1992 (R. 203-204). The trial court 
subsequently found Mr. Brooks guilty of the third count (T2 610), 
and sentenced Mr. Brooks to two terms of five years to life and one 
one to fifteen year term, to run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to his time from a previous conviction, and 
consecutively to a zero to five year gun enhancement term (R. 
210-213). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Martha Vert and her two daughters, Tiffany, 16, and 
Stephanie, 23, were at home on January 28, 1991, when a young man 
came to their home to examine a diamond ring that Stephanie was 
selling. He had apparently read Stephanie's ad in the paper, called 
the Vert residence to set up an appointment, and then arrived as 
scheduled. He carried a large walkie talkie with him, and spent 
1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to as 
R. The transcript of the second trial will be referred to as T2, 
with page references to the court reporters' pagination, rather than 
to the record stamp. 
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about 30 to 45 minutes in the Vert home visiting and making 
arrangements to come with his father to the Vert home the next 
morning, when his father would pay for the ring. T2 102-108, 203-208. 
The next morning around 9:00, the young man came to the 
Vert residence, and was wearing a hat, sunglasses and gloves and 
carrying the walkie talkie he had the night before. Stephanie was 
the only person home when he arrived. After he entered the home and 
she began making coffee, he pulled a gun on Stephanie, handcuffed 
her to the plumbing in the basement bathroom, and gathered various 
items of jewelry worth approximately $5,500 from the Vert 
residence. Stephanie heard him say into the walkie talkie that he 
would be out in three seconds, and heard him leave the house. She 
unscrewed the plumbing and reached her mother on the phone. The 
police were called and an investigation ensued. T2 108-117, 122, 
210-219. 
Martha, Tiffany and Stephanie Vert identified Mr. Brooks as 
the young man who came to their home, and Stephanie testified that 
it was Mr. Brooks who returned to their home and robbed her. T2 
105-108, 139-143, 159-160, 206, 211-212, 219. 
The remainder of the evidence presented at the two trials 
concerns whether or not the Verts were correct in identifying Mr. 
Brooks as the young man who came to their home and as the robber, 
and concerns events after the robbery, and is not necessary to the 
issues to be resolved by this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury voir dire demonstrates that one panelist was 
incompetent, but served on Mr. Brooks' jury. The panelist revealed 
during voir dire that his wife's physical therapy and his 
responsibilities to his wife would impair his ability to pay 
attention to the trial. The trial court conducted an inadequate 
voir dire to rebut the inference of bias attaching to three 
panelists who had suffered crimes similar to those at issue for the 
jury's assessment. Trial counsel did not request additional voir 
dire or challenge the panelists for cause. Trial counsel removed 
one of the similar-crimes panelists with a peremptory challenge, and 
the other two panelists served on Mr. Brooks' jury. This record 
demonstrates that Mr. Brooks should be given a new trial wherein the 
jury is selected properly. 
Mr. Brooks should not have been convicted of burglary and 
robbery because Utah statutory and state and federal constitutional 
law prohibit punishing Mr. Brooks twice for one crime. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INADEQUACY OF THE JURY SELECTION 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE JURY SELECTION PROCEEDINGS. 
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts to 
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire proceedings. 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn.1-6 (Utah 1988)(citing 
Article I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the 
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Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution). 
The Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power 
to reiterate to the trial courts of this state that it is their 
responsibility to insure that voir dire proceedings not only provide 
adequate information for the informed exercise of peremptory 
challenges, but also eliminate bias and prejudice from criminal 
trials. State v. Jamesf 819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991). In 
James, the court directed the trial courts to go beyond the 
minimally adequate voir dire required by federal constitutional 
standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror biases to the best 
of their ability, rd. Utah's allegiance to the need for thorough 
voir dire in criminal cases has been strong and consistent. State 
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988); State v. Ballf 685 
P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 1984). 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the right to 
an impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 (e)(14) 
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are 
adequate to reveal juror biases. The rule provides that a juror 
should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a state 
of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging[. ]lf 
In addition to proscribing the service of panelists who 
suffer from bias relevant to the case to be tried, the rule requires 
the court to conduct an adequate voir dire to identify panelists who 
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are not competent to serve because of "any mental or physical 
infirmity." Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(2). This rule is 
consistent with the constitutional rights to a mentally competent 
jury. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987). See 
also State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984)(juror competency 
is separate issue from juror impartiality). 
"Trial courts are responsible for safeguarding a 
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury." State v. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). Trial courts are 
also responsible to determine whether prospective jurors are legally 
competent to serve. Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-8. 
B. THE JURY SELECTION IN THIS CASE WAS INADEQUATE. 
1. Juror Barber was incompetent. 
The trial court asked the jurors, "Are there any of you who 
have any pressing or urgent business or personal matters over the 
next four days that would prevent you from providing satisfactory 
jury service of the next four days?" (T2 29). Panelist Frank L. 
Barber was one of two jurors to respond to this question. In 
response to the court's question as to his ability to provide 
satisfactory jury service, Mr. Barber indicated under oath, "Since I 
qualified for the jury list my wife has had knee surgery and I'm 
required to take her for therapy three times a week, Monday, 
Wednesdays and Fridays at 5:00 o'clock in Sandy." The court asked 
if other arrangements could be made to get his wife to therapy, and 
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Mr. Barber indicated, "I have been unable to so far." The court 
asked if Mr. Barber was trying to make other arrangements. Mr. 
Barber indicated, "Well, she has until — a week from today she goes 
in to the doctor to see if the therapy has been successful." The 
court indicated, "I understand. But the question was: Is there any 
other possibility to work out other arrangements?" Mr. Barber 
responded, "I don't have anyone I could trust with her." The court 
asked Mr. Barber if he had checked to see if the therapy could be 
rescheduled, and Mr. Barber indicated that he had not. The court 
then stated, "Ordinarily, we are in recess. So, if you are 
selected, the Court would appreciate having you see if that — the 
time could be changed; and we'd recess in time enough to allow you 
to do that. Given that accommodation, do you feel that could you 
serve?" Mr. Barber answered, "I am not sure that I could devote my 
undivided attention to the case under the circumstances." (T2 
29-31). 
Mr. Barber was not rehabilitated with further questioning, 
challenged for cause or removed with a peremptory challenge. He 
served on Mr. Brooks' jury. 
In contrast, the other juror who responded to the court's 
question about being able to provide satisfactory jury service, Gary 
Pickering, indicated that as a matter of conscience stemming from 
his interpretation of his religion, he could not serve on a jury (T2 
25, 31). The trial court removed Mr. Pickering for cause, despite 
the fact that Mr. Pickering was so far down the jury list that he 
would not have served in any event (T2 85; R. 152). 
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Just as the triri'l court removed panelist Pickering, the 
c , il i inn "if ,11 | iiiiieJI ist. B a r b e r , who, due Lu his wile's 
condition and his responsibility to his wife, revealed that he was 
too preoccupied to serve in this case. Mr. Barber's inabil it >» t > 
sen •• il In I i HI I I, I I IMI in I jndered him incompetent to serve. 
The United States Supreme Court "has recognized that a 
defendant has r« >-• «•" tribunal both impartial and menta 
c Dmpe tei i 1: nearinc banner v. United States, - S. 
107, 126 (1987)(citation omitted). In Tanner, the Court affirmed 
the lower courts' judgment that under the Federal iilf-'iiro 
concerning juror drug ring deliberations were 
inadmissible to impeach the verdict. Id. 109-12 After 
reviewing the policy reasons I in b/..- Il i n j i y 
deliberations, the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to 
competent jury was adequately protected by other procedural 
remedies. The first sue -ocedu* • - I tl ICII S ii : :: t::l i 
Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury mentioned by the Court 
was jury voir dire. Id. T K* failure of the trial court 
this cast remove T H > i I • 11 • 1 I Ii H i ,M ,iI,>.r 
mentally competent jury. See id. 
Numerous Utah statutes and rules recognize that when jurors 
are unable to engage 1 Mr l i I nin ii I I' i P«I V i I Ii I li 'I.I« v I  l\ -i I i s I, c-? i. JIU 
presented, they are not competent to ser v e. Ill ider Utah law, it is 
the duty of the trial court to assess juror competency. Utah Code 
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(1) The court, on its own initiative or when 
requested by a prospective juror, shall determine 
whether the prospective juror is disqualified 
from jury service. The court shall base its 
decision on the information provided on the juror 
qualification form, or by interview with the 
prospective juror or other competent evidence. 
The clerk shall enter the court's determination 
on the juror qualification form and on the 
alphabetical list of names drawn from the master 
jury wheel. 
Subsection (2)(c) indicates that the following describes an 
incompetent juror: 
(c) a person who is not capable because of 
physical or mental disability of rendering 
satisfactory jury service. 
This subsection further grants the court the power to require proof 
of the disability from a physician. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(1) indicates that a 
challenge for cause lies if a juror is legally unqualified to 
serve. Subsection (e)(2) indicates that a challenge for cause 
should be granted if a prospective juror suffers from "any physical 
or mental infirmity" compromising his ability to serve. Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) indicates, in part, that a challenge 
for cause lies if "a state of mind exists on the part of the juror 
with reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging." (Emphasis added). Because Mr. 
Barber was unable to pay attention, his service was prejudicial to 
Mr. Brooks' rights to a fair trial, and to the unanimous verdict of 
eight competent jurors. The service of Mr. Barber on Mr. Brooks' 
jury thus violated not only his federal rights to a competent jury, 
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but also numerous Utah statutes designed to protect that right. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions demonstrate that 
whej
 A physically aentally unaoie to listen 
to the evidence, that juror is not competent to serve should be 
removed for cause. See Neal v, State, A hi) So. 2d 
( court d id not abust; ::i ts ciiscretior 
striking two panelists, one of whom could not concentrate because 
his child would be left home unattended, and one 
physically unable to attend the long trial ); Hernandez v. State, 643 
S.W.2d 397, 401-402 (Tex. Cr.App. 1983)(trial court did not abuse 
its discretion ::i in: i removing 
juror who was incompetent to serve dij a result of physical and 
mental defects); Goodwin v. State, 799 S W .2 it 7] 9, 736-737 
for cause of juror whi, indicated that she would probably not give 
full attention to the tri al , and was physically impaired by her 
pregnancy l i"ii I denie^ ^llarreal v. 
State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1979)(trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by granting prosecution's challenge for cause of 
p a n e l n s t i I'll i iiiii :::I ::i • : 
would prevent her service); State v. Jett, 805 P.2d 78, E2 (N.M. 
1991)(juror who does not understand English well enough to assess 
L i t e i ,, nil- nil i in IIIII Il  in {mi in Il mi III IIIII i III II in i I ; Mahan v . Farmers union 
Central Exchange, 768 P.2d 850, 855 (Mont. 1989)(court should remove 
juror who appears to have difficulty speaking and hearing); State v. 
Miliex ^hough . . , 
competence is a matter for judicial determination, a juror's 
specific statement of such a factual matter, that is, what he or she 
could or could not hear, should control over a judge's opinion 
regarding the juror's ability to hearing in the absence of some 
indication of insincerity or falsehood on the part of the juror."); 
State v. Galleqos, 542 P.2d 832 (N.M. 1975)(it would violate state 
constitutional law requiring unanimous jury verdict in criminal case 
for criminal conviction to stand when one of the jurors could not 
understand English well enough to understand the issues and exercise 
his independent judgment); Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 423-425 
(Miss.)(trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing jurors 
who were sleeping, on medication, and incoherent and contradictory 
during voir dire), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); Commonwealth 
v. Gibbons, 549 A.2d 1296, 1302-1303 (Pa.Super. 1988)(trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in removing panelist who said that she 
was too nervous to serve on the jury). 
As a result of Mr. Barber's wife's physical disability, and 
his resultant inability to pay full attention to this case, he was 
not competent to serve as a constitutionally adequate juror. In 
allowing Mr. Barber to serve on Mr. Brooks' jury when Mr. Barber was 
not competent to do so, the trial court violated the court's 
statutory duty to insure the legal qualification of the jurors. 
Given the constitutional rights at stake in a criminal trial, and 
the ease of dismissing Mr. Barber and using another panelist, the 
trial court abused his discretion in allowing Mr. Barber to serve as 
one of the eight jurors in this case. 
-12-
2. The voir dire was inadeguate to rebut the inference of bias 
attaching to three prospective jurors who had experienced burglaries 
and/or robberies, 
A review of the voir dire transcript reflects that 
panelists Pike and Heap p a n e i Jeurts 
was removed with Mr. Brooks' first peremptory challenge ( 
151-152). The record reflects that these three panelists had all 
experienced ) 1 ! i:)iie of the three 
jurors was challenged for cause or asked one question concerning how 
their prior victimization would influence their performance ir tii is 
case examined nambers 
concerning how their prior victimization of robberies burglaries 
would influence their performance, and that of them was removed 
for cause jurfered robberies 
and/or burglaries were also left unexamined concerning how these 
experiences would influence their performance, and wer amoved 
. . I , .*. . at It did 
not appear that they would serve (T2 68-8' L51-152). 
This case was tried after the publicat inn nl' Statu v, 
Woolle ml denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991) which this Court held that when panelists have been 
victims of the crimes similar " those to INI it jetl in i iif i >i t ? i n i i 
, requiring the trial court to probe 
the jurors in further voir dire until the inference of bias 
rebutted. 
federal constitutional law governing this issue is 
discussed Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 166 (1965). There, the 
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Court reversed a state court decision affirming a conviction and 
death sentence. There, the jurors were constantly escorted by 
members of the sheriff's office, including two officers who 
testified against the defendant. The state court disapproved of the 
proceedings in the trial court, but held that no reversible error 
had occurred because the defendant had shown no evidentiary 
prejudice. Id. at 466-471. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding 
that the trial court proceedings violated due process, as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 471. The Court stated, 
In essence, the right to jury trial 
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial 
by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. 
The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing 
violates even the minimal standards of due 
process. 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process.' In the 
ultimate analysis, only the jury can strip a man 
of his liberty or his life. In the language of 
Lord Coke, a juror must be 'indifferent as he 
stands unsworne.' His verdict must be based upon 
the evidence developed at the trial. This is 
true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime 
charged, the apparent guilt of the offender or 
the station of life which he occupies. ... 
The requirement that a jury's verdict "must 
be based upon the evidence developed at the 
trial" goes to the fundamental integrity of all 
that is embraced in the constitutional concept of 
a trial by jury. "The jury is an essential 
instrumentality — an appendage — of the court, 
the body ordained to pass upon guilt or 
innocence. Exercise of calm and informed 
judgment by its members is essential to proper 
enforcement of law. . . . 
Id. at 471-472 (citations omitted). 
In recognition of the fundamental nature of the right to a 
fair and impartial jury, Utah Courts have required trial courts to 
conduct adequate inquiries into juror biases during jury selection 
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proceedings, 1r*T* ~1"1 ->f the jurors who had experienced 
the crimes at issue in the instant case should have been removed r r 
cause, examined carefully inn i I I lhi i in t i cure il in as arising 
from the jurors' experiences was rebutted. See State v. Woolleyf 
810 P.2d 440, 442-448 (Utah App.)(inference of bias arising from 
juror's prior victi iii za I:::i :: i i :: f same c i: i m = ci 1: i ssue in case was not 
sufficiently rebutted), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 85] (Utah 1991); 
State v. Cobby 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989)(juror acquaintance 
with proseciil m , i III! I'll prciliocl d i n in \ i i Hi i itJ u o l r a i s e 
inference of bias requiring rebuttal); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 
(Utah App, 1992)(trial court failed to remove juror 
examine her in »M,enii»'in " ' inferen :"»; 'i,l bias, stemming from her 
relationships with the prosecutor and police was rebutted); State v. 
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 765-768 (Utah 1980)(trial 
removed
 e x a m j _ n e d them until the inference of 
bias arising from their partiality toward police officers was 
rebutted). 
r
, .abused hiu discretion . ~ ^ailing to conduct 
an adequate voir dire ot remove the jurors whose experiences with 
crimes similar * those at issue here raisfirl Innri I i| i".l i JIII.,. d l * u L 
See State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 47b n.l (Utah 
1987)(comparing voir dire of jurors removed for cause with voir dire 
of jurors removed with peremptory challenges 
rebui lality); State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 765-768 
(Utah 1980)(same). The service of the jurors with prior 
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victimizations, when there was no rebuttal of the inference of bias 
attaching to those jurors, was reversible error. See e.g. Woolley 
at 442 ("The Utah Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that 'it 
is [the trial judge's] duty to see that the constitutional right of 
an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded,' and has reversed 
criminal convictions based solely on the appearance that such right 
may have been jeopardized."). 
The use of Mr. Brooks' peremptory challenge to remove 
panelist Geurts, whom should have been stricken for cause in the 
absence of the rebuttal of the inference of bias, was also 
reversible error. See e.g. State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 
1980)(it is prejudicial error to require defendant to use peremptory 
challenge to remove juror who should have been removed for cause); 
State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-803 (Utah 1977)(same); Crawford 
v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975)(same). 
C. THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
Trial courts are granted broad discretion and carry a heavy 
responsibility in conducting voir dire in criminal cases. E.g. 
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 504-510 (1991); State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991). Under the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, trial courts are not required to use voir dire questions 
requested by defense counsel in criminal cases, and defense 
attorneys are not required to object to the omissions of the trial 
courts. Compare Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 18 and 20(b) with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 46 and 47(a). 
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The rules of criminal procedure are consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's exhortations the trial courts 
efferl I\M > I, i , > I ml In I I institutional rights at 
stake in criminal cases. E.g. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-798 
(Utah 1991); State . Bishop, 753 P.2d 
- "ates Supreme Court has also recognized that 
there may be cases wherein jurors are so obviously and prejudicially 
unqualified to serve that trial courts have i , • ii :t I :i : \ x = 
sua sponte, Frazier v. United States, ^,> u.^* 4^/, 513 
(1948) . 
'I n conducting the voir dire i i i t I i = :i i : .stai it c a s e tl \e ti :i e .] 
^ court's federal constitutional duties, and 
failed to follow the supervisory guidelines set forth in James The 
trial court did not fulfill his : s 
attaching to the similar-crimes panelists, as required by 
Woolley. The court also failed his statutory duty to see that the 
jurors wh served i I h I it < i »l :<=• , | .) 
so. See .tah Code Ann. section 78-46-8. Thus, reviewing the 
totality of the questioning in this case, this Court can see that 
the voir dire was inadequate I I 
discretion. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 4 IS. 
In the alternative, the inadequate voir dire may be 
attribute .aendmei : 
for ineffective assistance , counsel normally requires a 
showing that trial counsel' *rformance fell below objective 
Is performance was 
•x /• 
prejudicial. E.g. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 
(1984). However, in certain contexts, the prejudice prong is 
presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In circumstances involving 
the violation of the right to a fair and impartial jury trial, 
prejudice should be presumed. See e.g. Presley v. State, 750 S.W.2d 
602, 607 (Mo. App.)(reversing conviction on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in jury selection; finding that 
prejudice should be presumed), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988). 
See also State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985)(rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice attaches to jurors tainted by information 
extraneous to the trial because "prejudice may well exist even 
though it is not provable and even though a person who has been 
tainted may not, himself, be able to recognize that fact."). 
Particularly because an incompetent juror served in this case, and 
Mr. Brooks was thereby denied his state constitutional right to the 
unanimous verdict of eight competent jurors, the conviction should 
be considered a nullity. See Constitution of Utah, Article I 
section 10; State v. Gallegos, 542 P.2d 832 (N.M. 1975)(it would 
violate state constitutional law requiring unanimous jury verdict in 
criminal case for criminal conviction to stand when one of the 
jurors could not understand English well enough to understand the 
issues and exercise his independent judgment); State v. Bates, 61 P. 
905 (Utah 1900)(jury conviction rendered by eight jurors was a 
nullity and without jurisdiction because it involved the ex post 
facto application of the Utah Constitution where the territorial 
laws in effect at the time of the murder required twelve jurors). 
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Fundamental structural errors impacting on the right to a fair and 
impartial jury are traditionally reversed without -howinq 1 
ev : • * " i ,1 in i v" prejudice. E . q. State v. Pharris, Utah Adv. Rep. 
39, (Utah App. 1993). Prejudice should be presumed in thi s 
case. See id. 
Trial counsel's conduct fell below reasonable standards of 
performance. Defense attorneys have the obligation to protect the 
right to an impartial jury t , U •. State v. LID. Mi lie *'" "" Ml PI 
83 85 (U tal: I ] 988) (defense counsel must participate a,, , oir dire, ^ 
object to trial court's failure to provide adequate voir dire), See 
also ABA Standards for Criminal 3 ustice ' Hi1 hcfensp M m "I i n " 
Standard 4- 3 (defense attorneys are obliged to follow proper 
procedures, and present appropriate motions and objections to 
protect the rights i 
Woolley. Mr. Brooks was entitled to the unanimous verdict of eight 
competent jurors, Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10, 
II 111 III 1 II II IK I I I II I I II I I II ill I < II I III II II II I I I I II II II II II I I HI II II I I II II II I ill II II III i -
challenged panelist Barber for cause when it became apparent that 
Mr. Barber was incompetent serve. Trial counsel should have 
Ji i priori I I III II mi in in III ill, ,
 -t ••imiie, 
supra, but did not. Rather than using one of Mr. Brooks' peremptory 
challenges to remove panelist Geurts, trial counsel should have 
Lerenc 
attached. E.g. Woolley, supra. 
Trial counsel's failure to challenge panelist Barber and 
request
 a n a d e g U a t e j ^ e panelists cannot be 
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construed as valid tactical decisions. The service of eight 
competent jurors is a fundamental requirement to a fair trial. 
Trial counsel could not make a valid strategic choice to allow the 
panelists to remain on the panel or to use one of his client's 
peremptory challenges until he had made a reasonable investigation 
of the panelists' presumptive biases in an adequate voir dire. E.g. 
Strickland at 690-691 (strategic choices are valid only if based on 
a reasonable investigation of the law and facts). See also Broberg 
v. Hessf 782 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah App. 1989)("The purposes of a jury 
voir dire examination are to detect bias sufficient to challenge a 
juror for cause and to collect information to permit an intelligent 
use of peremptory challenges"). 
The shortcomings of the voir dire in this case and the 
inadequacy of the jury selected should naturally undermine the 
Court's confidence in the jury's verdict. The procedural harm 
resulting from the service of one incompetent juror, from the 
service of two presumptively prejudiced jurors, and from the use of 
a peremptory challenge to remove a presumptively prejudiced juror 
who should have been challenged for cause or examined further, 
cannot readily be translated into an evidence-based prejudice 
analysis. As the Court explained in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
577-578 (1986), in discussing the application of the harmless error 
doctrine, there are some constitutional violations which cannot be 
addressed with an evidence-based prejudice analysis. Id. at 
577-578. After giving examples of constitutional violations that 
are not subject to harmless error analysis, the Court explained, 
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Without these basic protections, a criminal trial 
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle 
for determination of guilt or innocence, and no 
criminal punishment may be regarded as 
fundamentally fair. Harmless-error analysis thus 
presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, 
represented by counsel, may present evidence 
argument before an impartial judge and jury. 
Id. at 577-r,7fi ,i;„ it .it .1 1 I I I I I I) . 
Given the fundamental procedural rights violated here, 
prejudice should be presumed. E.g. Presley, supra. Several > iis»i,:-i 
recogr ' -•* f; en s v .,1! terneys, fail to advocate their 
clients' rights during jury selection, ineffective assistance of 
counsel has occurred and requires a new trial. E.g. Presley v. 
State, supra; MJI»UII V.. State, 1986) ; People v. 
Wagner, 104 A.D.2d 457, 479 N.Y.S.2d 66 (A.D.2 Dept. 1984). 
Particularly given the facts that Mr. Brooks' iKiiiii » in hided 
one in nrrmipp? m m | il  i in i i presumptively tainted jurors, and 
that one of Mr. Brooks' peremptory challenges was used to remove a 
juror who should have been excused for cause in t hv iibspii i i 
r^btil I <i 1 »I Mi I resumpi prejudice attaching to her, defense 
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, and supports a 
claim of ineffective assistance oi counse .oolley; Bailey; 
Strickland; Presley, supra. 
Alternatively, given the clear statutes and case law 
establishing the need *j- competent iur^i c" ""|l1 ',l «Heqij ** - el, IH, 
espei, I II', i "in i«-I involving inferences of bias, the errors in this 
case should be addressed by this court under the plain error 
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doctrine. See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 and nn.7-11 
(Utah), cert, denied, 101 S.Ct. 62 (1989)(court should use plain 
error doctrine to see that justice is done; plain error occurs when 
error should have been plain to the trial court and was 
prejudicial). Juror Barber's incompetence, and the need to voir 
dire all of the panelists with histories of burglary and robbery 
victims should have been clear to the trial court. The Utah code 
and rules, the Utah and Federal Constitutions, and ample case law 
establish that incompetent panelists cannot legally serve on a 
criminal jury. This case was tried after Woolley, wherein this 
Court emphasized the trial courts' duties to insure fair trials, and 
wherein this Court reiterated the need for trial courts to 
investigate and/or rebut the inference of bias attaching to 
panelists who have suffered the same crimes as are at issue to be 
tried. 
The errors were prejudicial to Mr. Brooks' case, 
particularly to his fundamental procedural rights. As the foregoing 
discussion of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine 
demonstrates, evidentiary prejudice should be presumed in this 
instance, wherein the errors impacted on fundamental structural 
procedural rights to a fair, impartial and unanimous jury. As the 
Utah Supreme Court stated long ago in reversing a capital conviction 
and sentence without assessing evidentiary prejudice, in a case 
wherein the defendant made a post-trial discovery that two of his 
jurors had failed to reveal actual biases during voir dire, 
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,f[I]t is never too late to do justice. . . . " 
The court is constituted to enforce legal rights 
and redress legal wrongs, and whenever it is made 
to appear, as it is in this case, that a wrong 
has been perpetrated, it never hesitates to 
exercise the power which it has, unless to do so 
would do a greater injury than to refuse to 
exercise it. 
State v. Morgan, 64 P. 356, 362 (Utah 1901)(citation omitted). 
II. 
MR. BROOKS' CONVICTION FOR 
BURGLARY MUST BE STRICKEN. 
Mr. Brooks was convicted of both aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary for the event which occurred at the Vert 
residence on January 29, 1991 (R. 203-204). The constitutional law 
governing this issue is set forth in Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 
(Utah App. 1990), as follows: 
[N]o person may be placed in jeopardy for the 
same criminal offense more than once. U.S. 
Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, §12. The 
federal and state double jeopardy guarantees are 
viewed as having the same content, affording 
defendants three separate protections: no second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 
no second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction, and no multiple punishments for the 
same offense. 
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(2)(a) provides, "No person 
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-1-402 provides additional statutory protection from 
multiple punishments for one crime, stating: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate offenses 
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arising out of a single criminal episode;2 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any 
such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
The statutory term "act" is defined as "a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech." Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601(1). State v. 
Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1989). 
The relevant "act" for purposes of the statute and double 
jeopardy was the armed robbery.3 The robbery occurred after 
Stephanie allowed the young man into Vert residence and began making 
coffee for them. Under the Utah Code and the facts of this case, 
there was no separate act underlying the burglary conviction, which 
2. "[A]11 conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective" constitutes a "single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-1-401. 
3. Robbery is defined as "the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by 
means of force or fear." Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301. Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-6-302 defines aggravated robbery as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree 
felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt 
to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
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required the unlawful remaining in the Vert residence with a gun and 
the intent to commit a robbery.4 "Remaining" is not a "voluntary 
bodily movement;" it is necessarily encompassed in the robbery. On 
the facts of this case, one could not have committed the robbery 
without necessarily committing the burglary. The burglary 
conviction should be reversed. See Duran, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-601(1), supra. 
While the trial counsel did not raise this issue, this 
Court should nonetheless address it on the merits. Authority for 
vacating the illegal sentence underlying the burglary conviction is 
provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), which states, 
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner, at any time." Issues concerning the dual 
punishment for one crime are considered sentencing issues. E.g. 
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). The rule permits 
4. "A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-6-202. 
Aggravated burglary is defined by Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-203 as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary the actor or another participant 
in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who 
is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or dangerous weapon. 
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justice to be done regardless of whether the illegal sentence is 
addressed in the trial court. E.g. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 
(Utah), cert, denied 112 S.Ct. 883 (1992). 
Alternatively, this Court should utilize the plain error 
doctrine to address the merits of Mr. Brooks' illegal sentence. The 
error in convicting and sentencing Mr. Brooks for two separate first 
degree felonies for one crime should have been plain to the trial 
court. Allowing Mr. Brooks to suffer a superfluous first degree 
felony conviction and sentence is prejudicial. See State v. 
Eldredge, supra, discussing the plain error doctrine. 
Alternatively, trial counsel's failure to raise this issue 
was objectively deficient and prejudicial. Mr. Brooks should not be 
punished for his attorney's failure to raise this sentencing issue, 
and this Court may reach the merits of this issue and correct the 
error under the auspices of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine. See Strickland, ABA Standards, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Brooks' convictions and order 
a new trial with a voir dire that is adequate to provide a fair and 
impartial jury. This Court should order that upon Mr. Brooks' 
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Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 




Sec* 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person gh«H be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 





[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all sepa-
rate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, 
or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against 
any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as 
under Section 76-1-601. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
( D A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors. 
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if the person is-
(a) a citizen of the United States; 
(b) over the age of 18 years; 
(c) a resident of the county; and 
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the English language. 
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or secondary locations for the 
circuit court, a person is not competent to serve as a juror in cases involving 
the violation of a municipal ordinance unless the person, in addition to meet-
ing the requirements listed in Subsection (1), resides within the municipality 
whose ordinance is alleged to have been violated or, in the case of a municipal-
lty with a population of fewer than 3,000 persons, resides within 15 miles of 
the municipality. 
78-46-8. Determination on juror qualification — Persons 
not competent to serve as jurors. 
(1) The court, on its own initiative or when requested by a prospective 
juror, shall determine whether the prospective juror is disqualified from jury 
service. The court shall base its decision on the information provided on the 
juror qualification form, or by interview with the prospective juror or other 
competent evidence. The clerk shall enter the court's determination on the 
juror qualification form and on the alphabetical list of names drawn from the 
master jury wheel. 
(2) The following persons are not competent to serve as jurors: 
(a) a person who has been convicted of a felony; 
(b) a person serving on active duty in the military service of the United 
States; 
(c) a person who is not capable because of physical or mental disability 
of rendering satisfactory jury service. Any person who claims this dis-
qualification may be required to submit a physician's certificate verifying 
the disability and the certifying physician is subject to inquiry by the 
court at its discretion; or 
(d) a person who does not meet the requirements of Section 78-46-7. 
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Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor, and, if 
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or 
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addi-
tion to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those other-
wise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall 
not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made 
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual 
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A 
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chal-
lenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. 
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as pro-
vided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken 
on one or more of the following grounds: 
( D A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor 
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license 
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fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to 
such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the ac-
tion, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as 
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, 
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such 
challenge. 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sus-
tained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, 
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and 
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the 
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his 
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the 
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place 
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them 
on any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either dur-
ing the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished 
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by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury 
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be 
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must 
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers 
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from 
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves 
or any of them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delib-
eration, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testi-
mony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in 
writing or taken down by the reporter. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. 
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in 
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with 
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury dis-
charged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the 
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment 
for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict When the jury or three-fourths of them, or 
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to 
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their 
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the 
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the 
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either 
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or 
clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling 
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be 
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis-
charged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi-
cient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
may be sent out again. 
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Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause 
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant, 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. -
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or 
for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is 
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the chal-
lenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the chal-
lenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court snail decide the challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evi-
dence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges 
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen-
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alter-
nate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons 
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the 
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him. 
Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by 
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of 
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to 
run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless 
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period 
extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes days desig-
nated as holidays by the state or federal governments. 
(b) Enlargement of time. The court for good cause shown may upon mo-
tion enlarge the time prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any 
act, or may permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the 
court may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition for 
review from an order of an administrative agency, except as specifically au-
thorized by law. A motion for an enlargement of time shall be filed prior to the 
expiration of the time for which the enlargement is sought. A motion for 
enlargement of time shall: 
(1) State with particularity the reasons for granting the motion; 
(2) State whether the movant has previously been granted an enlarge-
ment of time and, if so, the number and duration of such enlargements; 
(3) State when the time will expire for doing the act for which the 
enlargement of time is sought; and 
(4) State the date on which the act for which the enlargement of time is 
sought will be completed. 
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of time for filing and 
service of briefs under Rule 26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for 
enlargement of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been 
previously granted, if the time has not already expired for doing the act for 
which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with 
the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b) of this rule. 
(d) Additional time after service by mail* Whenever a party is required 
or permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper 
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
